moderate and low. 8 High civil society involvement entails direct participation in peace negotiations, which led to a sustainable peace in Guatemala, Liberia, Mozambique and Sierra Leone.9 Moderate involvement is indirect participation, influencing peace-building efforts through different mechanisms, yet falling short of a direct seat at the negotiating table. Its outcome has been a peace modality with mixed outcomes, including sustained and failed peace. Northern Ireland is an example of sustained peace while South Sudan and Sri Lanka are archetypes of failed peace. The last category is low involvement where civil society groups are excluded from peace processes.10 The outcomes have predominantly been resumption of war in post-settlement environment. A clear example of failed peace processes “predicated on secrecy and exclusion” is the 1993 Oslo accords between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was flawed from the outset, and saw a full resumption of violence in the years after. Colombia An instructive case study for Afghanistan is the peace process in Colombia which had the direct involvement of war victims in negotiations that brought to an end a protracted five-decade long conflict, with 7 million victims.11 War victims helped shaped both the process and outcomes of peace where 60 individual victims, selected as representatives of the broader community of victims, organised into six 12-member delegations, and testified before the government and FARC negotiators.12 The victims’ participation helped move the position of the negotiators from denial to admission of perpetrating grave human rights violations, and helped shape the development of a broad transitional justice program. 13 The Integral System for Truth, Justice, Reparation and Nonrepetition created several complementary mechanisms including a Truth Commission, a Special Search Unit to located disappeared victims, comprehensive reparation measures and a Special Jurisdiction for Peace.14 The agreement included amnesties for fighters who did not commit a serious war crime, crime against humanity or genocide.15 These formal mechanisms were accompanied by an extensive effort to generate dialogue through the media, academia and public debate, which further contributed to the recognition of victims across Colombian society, and helped victims emerge as an important peace player. Many victims said that the testimonial process transformed them and their views about the conflict actors. The process had 88 John, A. Wanis-St, Kew, D. (2008) Civil society and peace negotiations: Confronting exclusion. International Negotiation (13) 11-36. 9 John, A. Wanis-St, Kew, D. (2008) Civil society and peace negotiations: Confronting exclusion, P.25, International Negotiation (13) 11-36. 10 Ibid 11 Brett, R. (2018) The role of victims’ delegations in the Santos-FARC peace talks, p. 269. In: Druliolle, V. & Brett, R. (eds.) The politics of victimhood in post-conflict societies: A comparative and analytical perspectives. St Anthony’s series, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK. 12 Brett, R. (2018) The role of victims’ delegations in the Santos-FARC peace talks, p. 268. In: Druliolle, V. & Brett, R. (eds.) The politics of victimhood in post-conflict societies: A comparative and analytical perspectives. St Anthony’s series, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK. 13 Ibid 14 Brett, R. (2018) The role of victims’ delegations in the Santos-FARC peace talks, p. 294. In: Druliolle, V. & Brett, R. (eds) The politics of victimhood in post-conflict societies: A comparative and analytical perspectives. St Anthony’s series, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK. 15 Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace, November 24, 2016. English version available on the website of the International Committee of the Red Cross. https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/colombia-peace-agreement