January 2018 asked victims to express whether they wanted the court to investigate war crimes in Afghanistan. Despite the very short time frame, low levels of outreach and immense access challenges, there were 699 representations, including 165 individual and 534 collective21, which again demonstrates a thirst for inclusion and justice amongst the war victims.22 Afghanistan’s Strategic Plan for Peace and Reconciliation, 2017 – 2020, is the guiding document that lays out the strategic framework for peace efforts, defines the roles and functions each government institution carries in the process and creates a prospect about type of peace modality the government envisions. The strategic leadership of the peace process resides with the President, Ashraf Ghani. The High Peace Council (HPC), with its 18-member operational staff and 79-member General Assembly, is tasked to carry out national consultation and the Executive Secretariat for Peace and Reconciliation Process (ESPRP), with its 232 staff, is mandated to facilitate peace negotiations between the government and the insurgent groups.23 There are clear commitments to an inclusive approach to negotiation in the Strategic Plan, which states that both negotiating and implementing peace requires a participatory approach, defined as engagement with a broad phalanx of Afghan actors and groups. The Plan lists political and jihadi leaders, women, tribal and local leaders, religious scholars, youth, victims of war, civil society, academic and research centres, as essential stakeholders in the peace process.24 However, there is great scepticism about inclusive sounding strategic plans that never have the political will for implementation. The most striking example of this is the abandoned Action Plan on Peace, Reconciliation and Justice, which was discarded by the then President Hamid Karzai, almost as soon as it was inaugurated in late 2006. The Action Plan, built on the outcome of AIHRC’s 2005 survey with 4000 Afghans, A Call for Justice, consisted of three key action points, acknowledging the suffering of victims, creating accountable institutions and truth-seeking and documentation. In addition to this, a 1,000-page Conflict Mapping report has been supressed by the Afghan government for many years. The report documents abuse between 1978 and 2001, and was carried out by the AIHRC in accordance with the Action Plan. There is broad scepticism about the work of the HPC, which is seen as a “symbolic body”, designed to give an impression of inclusion, but has never undertaken a substantive consultation with any groups in the country. It is dominated by former Jihadi leaders and former Taliban members, and is therefore seen as inimical to many victims’ interests.25 Organizationally it is described as dysfunctional, badly run, and ‘project seeking’. One HPC deputy described the council as a weak and ineffective body: “All the feedback we have provided so far have turned out to be entirely useless’.26 21 ICC, Annex 1, Public redacted, p. 8, 2 February 2018 For more see the website of the International Criminal Court. https://www.icc-cpi.int/afghanistan 23 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, High Peace Council, Strategic Plan: Peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan, p. 4, 1 June 2017 – 31 December 2020 and Functional review of HPC, ESPRP, PPCs and FOCS – Preliminary report v2, P.1, October 2018 24 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, High Peace Council, Strategic Plan: Peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan, 1 June 2017 – 31 December 2020 and Functional review of HPC, ESPRP, PPCs and FOCS – Preliminary report v2, pp, 21-23, October 2018, Kabul 25 Interview with four members of the TJCG: Qanei, Bakhtyari, Jawad, and Marefat, November 2018, Kabul 26 Interview, Sarabi, H. Deputy HPC, November 2018, Kabul. 22